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Abstract
A “statistician” takes an action on behalf of an agent, based on
the agent’s self-reported personal data and a sample involving other
people. The action that he takes is an estimated function of the agent’s
report. The estimation procedure involves model selection. We ask
the following question: Is truth-telling optimal for the agent given the
statistician’s procedure? We analyze this question in the context of a
simple example that highlights the role of model selection. We suggest
that our simple exercise may have implications for the broader issue
of human interaction with “machine learning” algorithms.
∗This paper is extracted from a significantly longer working paper titled “Incentive-
Compatible Estimators” (Eliaz and Spiegler (2018)). We thank Susan Athey, Yoav
Binyamini, Assaf Cohen, Rami Atar, Lorens Imhof, Annie Liang, Benny Moldovanu, Ron
Peretz and especially Martin Cripps for helpful conversations. We are also grateful to
seminar and conference audiences at Aarhus, Bocconi, DICE, UCL, Brown, Yale, BRIQ,
Warwick and ESSET, for their useful comments.
†School of Economics, Tel-Aviv University and Economics Dept., Columbia University.
E-mail: kfire@post.tau.ac.il.
‡School of Economics, Tel Aviv University; Department of Economics, University Col-
lege London; and CfM. E-mail: rani@post.tau.ac.il.
1
1 Introduction
In recent years, actions in ever-expanding domains are taken on our behalf by
automated systems that rely on machine-learning tools. Consider the case
of online content provision. A website obtains information about a user’s
personal characteristics. Some of these characteristics are actively provided
by the user himself; others are obtained by monitoring his online navigation
history. The website then feeds these characteristics into a predictive sta-
tistical model, which is estimated on a sample consisting of observations of
other users. The estimated model then outputs a prediction of the user’s
ideal content. In domains like autonomous driving or medical decision mak-
ing, AI systems are mostly confined to issuing recommendations for a human
decision maker. In the future, however, it is possible that decisions in such
domains will be entirely based on machine learning.
How should users interact with such a procedure? In particular, should
they truthfully share personal characteristics with the automatic system? Of
course, in the presence of a conflict of interests between the two parties -
e.g., when the online content provider has a distinct political or commercial
agenda - the user might be better off if he misreports his characteristics or
deletes “cookies” from his computer. This is a familiar situation of commu-
nication under misaligned preferences, which seems amenable to economists’
standard model of strategic information transmission as a game of incomplete
information (with a common prior).
However, suppose there is no conflict of interests between the two parties -
i.e., the objective behind the machine-learning algorithm is to make the best
prediction of the user’s ideal action. But how do such actual systems per-
form this prediction task? Consider a very basic textbook tool like LASSO1
(Tibshirani (1996)). This is a variant on standard linear regression analysis,
which adds a cost function that penalizes non-zero coefficients. The proce-
1Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator
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dure involves both model selection (i.e. choosing which of many available
variables will enter the regression) and estimation of the selected variables’
coefficients. The predicted action for an agent with a particular vector of
personal characteristics x is the dependent variable’s estimated value at x.
Such a procedure is considered useful when users have many potentially rel-
evant characteristics relative to the sample size, and especially when we can
expect few of them to be relevant for predicting the agent’s ideal action (i.e.,
the true data-generating process is sparse).
However, LASSO is not a fundamentally Bayesian procedure. Although
one can justify its estimates as properties of a Bayesian posterior derived from
some prior (Tibshirani (1996), Park and Casella (2008), Gao et al. (2015)),
these properties are not necessarily relevant for maximizing the user’s welfare.
Furthermore, there is no reason to assume that the prior that rationalizes
LASSO in this manner coincides with the user’s actual prior beliefs (the priors
in the above-cited papers involve Laplacian distributions over parameters).
Thus, neither the preferences nor the priors that take part in the Bayesian
foundation for LASSO are necessarily the ones an economic modeler would
like to attribute to the user in a plausible model of the interaction.
This observation could be extended to many machine-learning predictive
methods that are far more elaborate than the simple textbook example of
penalized regression. If we want to model human interaction with such algo-
rithms, some departure from the standard Bayesian framework with common
priors seems warranted. Put differently, if one were to analyze a model with
common priors, where a benevolent Bayesian decision maker tries to take the
optimal action for an agent with unknown characteristics, then for almost all
prior beliefs, the decision maker’s behavior will not be perfectly mimicked by
a familiar machine-learning procedure. Our approach in this paper is to take
the statistician’s procedure as given (rather than trying to provide a formal
rationalization for it) and examine the user’s strategic response to it.
Machine-learning algorithms can be extremely complicated. Neverthe-
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less, in this paper we follow the tradition of using simple “toy” models to get
insight into complex phenomena. Economists have developed models in this
tradition to study the behavior of large organizations or the macroeconomy;
surely these are more complex than the most intricate machine-learning algo-
rithm. Accordingly, our model is perhaps the simplest that can capture the
key element we wish to address - namely, how the element of model selection
in machine-learning algorithms affect users’ self-reporting decision.
Specifically, we present a model of an interaction between an “agent” and
a “statistician” - the latter is a stand-in for an automated system that obtains
personal data from the agent and outputs an action on his behalf. The agent
has a single binary personal characteristic x, which is his private informa-
tion. The agent has an ideal action, which is a function of x. This function
is unknown. The statistician learns about it by obtaining noisy observations
of other agents’ ideal actions. This sample constitutes the statistician’s pri-
vate information. It is small, consisting of one observation for each value
of x. The statistician follows a “penalized regression” procedure: the esti-
mated coefficients of his model minimize a combination of the Residual Sum
of Squares and a cost function that combines L0 and L1 penalties of the
coefficient of x. The procedure’s element of model selection in this simple
example consists of the decision whether to admit x as a predictor of the
agent’s ideal action.
With one binary characteristic and two sample points, this environment is
as far from “big data” as one could imagine. Nevertheless, it shares a crucial
feature with a typical big-data predicament that motivates machine-learning
methods: the sample size is roughly the same as the number of potential
explanatory variables, such that an estimation procedure that does not in-
volve selection or shrinkage risks over-fitting (e.g., see Hastie et al. (2015)).
Indeed, an unpenalized regression would perfectly fit the data. As a result,
the estimator would have high variance and its predictive performance could
be poor, relative to an estimator that excludes x or shrinks its coefficient.
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Thus, the merit of our simple example is that it manages to capture in a
tractable manner the over-fitting problem.
We pose the following question: Fixing the statistician’s procedure and
the agent’s prior belief over the true model’s parameters, would the agent al-
ways want to truthfully report his personal characteristics to the statistician?
When this is the case for all possible priors, we say that the statistician’s
procedure (or “estimator”) is incentive-compatible. Our analysis identifies
an aspect of the problem that creates a misreporting incentive. Because the
agent’s report of x only matters when this variable is selected by the statisti-
cian’s procedure, he should only care about the distribution of the variable’s
estimated coefficient conditional on the “pivotal event” in which the vari-
able’s coefficient is not zero. One can construct distributions of the sample
noise for which the estimated coefficient conditional on the pivotal event is so
biased that the agent is better off introducing a counter-bias by misreporting
his personal characteristic.
We refer to this effect as the “model selection curse”. As the term sug-
gests, the logic is reminiscent of pivotal-reasoning phenomena like the Win-
ner’s Curse in auction theory (Milgrom and Weber (1982)) or the Swing
Voter’s Curse in the theory of strategic voting (Feddersen and Pesendor-
fer (1996)). The model selection curse does not disappear with large sam-
ples: When the noise distribution is asymmetric, the statistician’s procedure
can fail incentive-compatibility even asymptotically. In contrast, we show
that when the sample noise is symmetrically distributed, the estimator is
incentive-compatible.
Related literature
Our paper joins a small literature that has begun exploring incentive issues
that emerge in the context of classical-statistics procedures. Cummings et
al. (2015) study agents with privacy concerns who strategically report their
personal data to an analyst who performs a linear regression. Caragiannis et
al. (2016) consider the problem of estimating a sample mean when the agents
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who provide the sample observations want to bias the mean close to their
value. Hardt et al. (2016) consider the problem of designing the most accu-
rate classifier when the input to the classifier is provided by a strategic agent
who faces a cost of lying. Chassang et al. (2012) argue for a modification
of randomized controlled trials when experimental subjects take unobserved
actions that can affect treatment outcomes. Banerjee et al. (2017) ratio-
nalize norms regarding experimental protocols (especially randomization) by
modeling experimenters as ambiguity-averse decision makers. Spiess (2018)
studies the design of estimation procedures that involve model selection when
the statistician and the social planner have conflicting interests (e.g., when
the statistician has a preference for reporting large effects).
2 A Model
An agent has a privately known, binary personal characteristic x ∈ {0, 1}.
In the context of medical decision making, x can represent a risk factor
(e.g. smoking). In the context of online content provision, it can indicate
whether the agent visited a particular website. A statistician must take an
action a ∈ R on the agent’s behalf. The agent’s payoff from action a is
−(a − f(x))2, where f(x) ∈ R is the agent’s ideal action as a function of x.
It will be convenient to write f(0) = β0 and f(1) = β0 + β1, such that β1
captures the effect of x on the agent’s ideal action. The parameter profile
β = (β0, β1) is unknown.
Before taking an action, the statistician privately observes a noisy signal
about f . Specifically, for each x = 0, 1, he obtains a single observation
yx = f(x) + εx, where ε0 and ε1 are drawn i.i.d from some distribution
with zero mean. Denote ε = (ε0, ε1). The observations do not involve the
agent himself. We have thus described an environment with two-sided private
information: the agent privately knows x, whereas the statistician has private
access to the sample (y0, y1).
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Equipped with the sample (y0, y1), the statistician follows a “penalized
regression” procedure for estimating β. That is, he solves the following min-
imization problem,
min
b0,b1
∑
x=0,1
(yx − b0 − b1x)2 + C(b1) (1)
The first term is the standard Residual Sum of Squares, whereas the sec-
ond term is a cost associated with b1; the intercept b0 entails no cost. (Of
course, given our simple set-up, referring to the procedure as a “penalized
regression” is a bit of an exaggeration.) The solution to (1) is denoted
b(ε, β) = (b0(ε, β), b1(ε, β)). We refer to (b(ε, β))ε as the estimator. The
dependence on (ε, β) follows from the fact that the estimator is a function of
(y0, y1), which in turn is determined by (ε, β).
We assume the penalty function
C(b1) = c01b1 6=0 + c1|b1|
where c0, c1 ≥ 0. This is a linear combination of two common forms: a
fixed cost for the mere inclusion of a non-zero coefficient (L0 penalty) and
a cost for the magnitude of the coefficient in absolute value (L1 penalty, or
LASSO).2 Assume that when the statistician is indifferent between including
and excluding x, he includes it.
In the absence of the penalty C, the solution to (1) is b0 = y0, b1 = y1−y0,
such that the Residual Sum of Squares is zero. In other words, the estimator
perfectly fits the data. As a result, the estimator’s predictive performance
will tend to be poor - relative to an estimator that sets b0 =
1
2
(y0+y1), b1 = 0
- when the true value of β1 is relatively small.
Having estimated f , the statistician receives a report r ∈ X from the
agent. The statistician then takes the action a = b0 + b1r. The agent’s
2Adding an L2 (Ridge) term c2(b1)
2 would not change any of the results in the paper.
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expected payoff for a given β is therefore
− Eε [(b0(ε, β) + b1(ε, β)r − β0 − β1x)]2 (2)
This expression can also be written as
−Eε[fˆ(r)− f(x)]2
where fˆ(r) = b0(ε, β)+b1(ε, β)r is the estimated model’s value at the agent’s
self-report r.
Note that the agent’s preferences are given by a quadratic loss function.
This is also a standard criterion for evaluating estimators’ predictive suc-
cess. Suppose that r = x - i.e., the agent submits a truthful report of his
personal characteristic. Then, the agent’s expected payoff coincides with the
estimator’s mean squared error.
The following are the key definitions of this paper.
Definition 1 The estimator is incentive compatible at a given prior
belief over the true model f (i.e. the parameters β) if the agent is weakly
better off truthfully reporting his personal characteristic, given his prior. That
is,
EβEε
[
fˆ(x)− f(x)
]2
≤ EβEε
[
fˆ(r)− f(x)
]2
for every x, r ∈ {0, 1}.
In this definition, the expectation operator Eε is taken with respect to
the given exogenous distribution over the noise realization profile. The ex-
pectation operator Eβ is taken with respect to the agent’s prior belief over
β.
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Definition 2 The estimator is incentive compatible if it is incentive com-
patible at every prior belief. Equivalently,
Eε
[
fˆ(x)− f(x)
]2
≤ Eε
[
fˆ(r)− f(x)
]2
(3)
for every true model f and every x, r ∈ {0, 1}.
Incentive-compatibility means that the agent is unable to perform better
by misreporting his personal characteristic, regardless of his beliefs over the
true model’s parameters. How should we interpret this requirement, given
that we do not necessarily want to think of the agent as being sophisticated
enough to think in these terms? One interpretation is that lack of incentive-
compatibility is a purely normative statement about the agent’s welfare -
namely, given how the statistician takes actions on the agent’s behalf, it
would be advisable for the agent to misreport. Furthermore, there are op-
portunities for new firms to enter and offer the agent paid advice for how
to manipulate the procedure - in analogy to the industry of “search engine
optimization”. Incentive-compatibility theoretically eliminates the need for
such an industry. In the context of online content provision, deviating from
x = 1 to r = 0 can be interpreted as “deleting a cookie”. This deviation is
straightforward to implement, and the agent can check if it leads to better
content match in the long run.
The agent’s expected payoff function is known to be decomposable into
two terms, one capturing the bias of estimator and another its variance.
Comparing the predictive success of different estimators thus boils down to
trading off the estimators’ bias and variance. Incentive-compatibility can
thus be viewed as a collection of bias-variance comparisons between two
estimators: one is the statistician’s estimator, and another is an estimator
that applies the statistician’s procedure to r rather than x. The latter is not
an estimation method that a real-life statistician is likely to propose, but it
arises naturally in our setting.
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3 Analysis
We first derive a complete characterization of the estimator.
Proposition 1 The solution to the statistician’s minimization problem (1)
is as follows:
b1(ε, β) =


β1 + ε1 − ε0 − c1 if β1 + ε1 − ε0 −
√
(c1)2 + 2c0 ≥ 0
β1 + ε1 − ε0 + c1 if β1 + ε1 − ε0 +
√
(c1)2 + 2c0 ≤ 0
0 otherwise
(4)
and
b0(ε, β) =
1
2
[y0 + y1 − b1(ε, β)]
The proof is mechanical and relegated to the supplementary appendix.
Note that L0 penalty leads to model selection without affecting the value of b1
conditional on being non-zero. The L1 penalty term leads to both shrinkage
and selection.
Let us now turn to incentive-compatibility. Two factors create a problem
in this regard: sample noise and model selection. Neither factor is problem-
atic on its own, as the following pair of observations establishes.
Claim 1 Suppose that ε = (0, 0) with probability one. Then, the estimator
is incentive compatible.
Proof. Suppose that β1 is such that b1 = 0. Then, the agent’s report has no
effect on the statistician’s action, and incentive-compatibility holds trivially.
Now suppose β1 is such that b1 > 0. Given the characterization of b1, we
must have β1 − c1 ≥ 0. The statistician’s action as a function of the agent’s
report is b0 if r = 0 and b0 + b1 if r = 1, where
b0 = β0 +
1
2
β1 −
1
2
b1 = β0 +
1
2
β1 −
1
2
(β1 − c1)
b0 + b1 = β0 +
1
2
β1 −
1
2
b1 + b1 = β0 +
1
2
β1 +
1
2
(β1 − c1)
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When x = 0 (x = 1), the agent’s ideal action is β0 (β0 + β1), and since
β1 − c1 ≥ 0, the action b0 (b0 + b1) is closer to the ideal point than b0 + b1
(b0). Thus, honesty is optimal for the agent. A similar calculation establishes
incentive-compatibility when b1 < 0.
Claim 2 If c0 = c1 = 0, then the estimator is incentive-compatible.
Proof. When c0 = c1 = 0, we have b1 = (β1 + ε1 − ε0). Suppose x = 1 and
the agent contemplates whether to report r = 0. In this case inequality (3)
can be simplified into
Eε[(b1(ε, β))
2 + 2b1(ε, β) · (b0(ε, β)− β0 − β1)] ≤ 0
Plugging in the expressions for b0(ε, β) and b1(ε, β) given by (4), this inequal-
ity reduces to
Eε¯0,ε¯1[−(β1)2 + 2β1ε0 + (ε1)2 − (ε0)2] ≤ 0 (5)
This inequality holds for all β1 because ε0 and ε1 are i.i.d with mean zero.
An analogous argument shows that an agent with x = 0 will not benefit from
reporting r = 1.
Thus, sampling noise and model selection are both necessary to produce
violations of incentive-compatibility in our simple set-up. This finding should
not be taken for granted. First, even in the absence of sampling noise, the
penalty C creates a wedge between the statistician’s objective function and
the agent’s utility. Therefore, it is not obvious a priori that this de-facto
conflict of interest does not give the agent an incentive to misreport. Second,
as long as the agent’s prior over β1 is not diffuse, the zero-penalty estima-
tor does not produce actions that maximize his subjective expected utility.
This, too, creates a de-facto conflict of interests between the two parties,
which nevertheless does not give the agent a sufficient incentive to misre-
port. One might think that the unbiasedness of the zero-penalty estimator
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explains Claim 2. However, this intuition is misleading because the agent’s
utility function involves a bias-variance trade-off. As a result, Claim 2 breaks
down when the statistician draws different numbers of observations for x = 0
and x = 1: the agent may be willing to experience a biased action due to
misreporting because it will reduce its variance.
We now turn to the case of noisy measurement and positive penalties.
The following example illustrates how incentive-compatibility can fail in this
case.
An example: Bernoulli noise
Assume the following noise distribution. For each x:
εx =


−1 with probability p
d = p/(1− p) with probability 1− p
where p > 1
2
, such that d > 1. For simplicity, we consider only the L0 penalty
(c1 = 0).
Consider an agent with x = 1 who reports r = 0. This misreporting
violates incentive-compatibility if there is some β1 for which
Eε [b0(ε, β) + b1(ε, β)− β0 − β1]2 > Eε [b0(ε, β)− β0 − β1]2
Because the agent’s misrepresentation only matters in the “pivotal event” in
which b1(ε, β) 6= 0, this inequality can be rewritten as
Eε0,ε1[−(β1)2 + 2β1ε0 + (ε1)2 − (ε0)2 | (β1 + ε1 − ε1)2 ≥ 2c0] > 0 (6)
For every β1 > 0, we can find a range of values for c0 such that (β1+ε1−ε0)2 ≥
2c0 only when ε1 = d and ε0 = −1. In this case, (6) is reduced to β1 < d− 1.
Therefore, every pair of positive numbers (β1, c0) that satisfies the in-
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equalities
−(d + 1) < √2c0 − β1 < d+ 1
β1 < d− 1
will violate incentive-compatibility. The intuition for this effect is as follows.
The pivotal event {ε | b1(ε, β) 6= 0} is determined by the difference ε1−ε0. For
a range of (β1, c0) values, ε1− ε0 = d+1 with probability one conditional on
the pivotal event. This produces such a biased estimate of b1 that the agent
wants to introduce an offsetting bias in the opposite direction by reporting
x = 0. 
The example illustrates a feature we refer to as the “model selection
curse”, in the spirit of the “winner’s curse” and “swing voter’s curse”. Like
these familiar phenomena, the model selection curse involves statistical in-
ferences from a “pivotal event”. Here, the pivotal event is the inclusion of an
explanatory variable in the statistician’s predictive model. The agent’s de-
cision whether to misreport his personal characteristic is relevant only if the
statistician’s model includes it. Misreporting will change the statistician’s
action by b1(ε, β)(r−x). Therefore, the agent only cares about the distribu-
tion of b1(ε, β) conditional on the event {ε | b1(ε, β) 6= 0}. This distribution
can be so skewed that the agent will prefer to introduce a counter-bias by
misreporting.
A key feature of the above example is the asymmetry in the noise dis-
tribution. Our next result shows that this is a crucial feature: Symmetric
noise ensures incentive-compatibility of the statistician’s procedure. For con-
venience, we consider the case in which the distribution of εx is described by
a well-defined density function. The result is stated for arbitrary c0, c1 ≥ 0.
Proposition 2 If εx is symmetrically distributed around zero, then the esti-
mator is incentive-compatible.
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Proof. Consider the deviation from x = 1 to r = 0. This deviation mat-
ters only if b1(ε, β) 6= 0. Incentive-compatibility thus requires the following
inequality to hold for all β0, β1:
Eε0,ε1[(b1(ε, β))
2 + 2b1(ε, β)(b0(ε, β)− β0 − β1) | b1(ε, β) 6= 0] ≤ 0
Plugging the expression for b0(ε) given by (4), this inequality reduces to
Eε0,ε1 [b1(ε, β)(−β1 + ε0 + ε1) | b1(ε, β) 6= 0] ≤ 0
Fix b1(ε, β) at some value b
∗
1 6= 0. Define E(b∗) = {(ε0, ε1) : b1(ε, β) = b∗1}.
Suppose E(b∗) is non-empty. Then, (u, v) ∈ E(b∗1) implies that (−v,−u) ∈
E(b∗). This follows immediately from the fact that b1(ε, β) is defined by the
difference ε1 − ε0. Because ε0 and ε1 are i.i.d and symmetrically distributed
around zero, the realizations (u, v) and (−v,−u) have the same probability.
This implies that for any given b∗1 6= 0,
Eε0,ε1 [b1(ε, β)(ε0 + ε1)|b1(ε, β) = b∗1] = 0
Therefore, showing that the deviation from x = 1 to r = 0 is unprofitable
reduces to showing that
β1Eε0,ε1 [b1(ε, β) | b1(ε, β) 6= 0] ≥ 0
which simplifies further to
β1Eε0,ε1(b1(ε, β)) ≥ 0
Suppose without loss of generality that β1 > 0. We will show that
Eε0,ε1(b1(ε, β)) ≥ 0. Denote ∆ = ε1 − ε0. Let G and g denote the cdf
and density of ∆. Since ε0 and ε1 are symmetrically distributed around zero,
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g is symmetric. Denote
c∗ =
√
(c1)2 + 2c0
We need to show that
∫ −c∗−β1
−∞
(β1 +∆+ c1)g(∆) +
∫ ∞
c∗−β1
(β1 +∆− c1)g(∆) ≥ 0 (7)
Denote t = β1 + c
∗, s = β1 − c1, and observe that because c∗ ≥ c1 ≥ 0,
t+ s > 0 and t− s > 0. By the symmetry of g, (7) becomes
=
∫ −t
−∞
(t+∆)g(∆)+
∫ ∞
−s
(s+∆)g(∆) = tG(−t)+sG(s)+
∫ t
s
∆g(∆) ≥ 0 (8)
Applying integration by parts and the symmetry of g, (8) becomes
∫ ∞
−∞
∆g(∆) +
∫ s
−∞
G(∆)−
∫ −t
−∞
G(∆) ≥ 0
Since
∫∞
−∞
∆g(∆) = Eε0,ε1(ε1 − ε0) = 0, the inequality we need to prove
reduces to ∫ s
−∞
G(∆)−
∫ −t
−∞
G(∆) ≥ 0
which holds because s > −t.
An analogous argument shows that deviation from x = 0 to r = 1 is
unprofitable.
The intuition behind this result is that symmetric noise curbs the model
selection curse: although model selection implies that b1 is a biased estimate
of β1, the bias is too small to give the agent the incentive to introduce the
counter-bias that results from misreporting.
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4 Does the Curse Vanish with Large Sam-
ples?
So far, we focused on a sample with two observations, hence, one may think
that the model selection curse is a small-sample phenomenon. In this section
we show that this need not be the case. Extend our model by assuming
that for each x = 0, 1, the statistician obtains N observations of the form
ynx = f(x) + ε
n
x, n = 1, ..., N , where ε
n
x is i.i.d with mean zero across all x, n.
The statistician’s problem is essentially the same:
min
b0,b1
∑
x=0,1
N∑
n=1
(ynx − b0 − b1xnk)2 +N (c01b1 6=0 + c1|b1|)
The entire model and its analysis are unchanged, except that now ε =
(εn0 , ε
n
1 )n=1,...,N ; and in the solution for the estimator (4), εx is replaced with
the average sample noise ε¯x =
1
N
∑n
i=1 ε
n
x. Denote ε = (ε
n
x)x=0,1;n=1,...,N .
Returning to the Bernoulli-noise example from the previous section, we
investigate whether the set of parameters that violate incentive compatibility
vanishes as N → ∞. We continue to assume c1 = 0 and restrict attention
to the case of β1 > 0 - both are without loss of generality. Suppose that
for every x = 0, 1 and every observation n = 1, ..., N , εnx is independently
drawn from the Bernoulli distribution that assigns probability p > 1
2
to −1
and probability 1 − p to d = p/(1− p). Let ε¯x(N) denote the average noise
realization over all the N observations for x ∈ {0, 1}. The pivotal event
{ε | b1(ε, β) 6= 0} can be written as
{
ε | ε¯1(N)− ε¯0(N) /∈
(−√2c0 − β1,√2c0 − β1)} (9)
Our goal is find the set of parameters for which incentive-compatibility is
violated in the N →∞ limit.
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Proposition 3 The set of parameters β1 > 0 and c0, d for which incentive-
compatibility is violated in the N →∞ limit is given by
β1 <
c0√
2c0 +
2d
d−1
(10)
Proof. We first find the limit distribution over (ε¯0(N), ε¯1(N)), conditional
on the event (9). To do this, it helps to combine the two samples (ε10, ..., ε
N
0 )
and (ε11, ..., ε
N
1 ) into one composite sample (η
1, ...., ηN), such that for every n,
ηn = (εn1 , ε
n
0 ). Thus, η
n is drawn i.i.d according to the following distribution
pi:
pi−1,−1 = Pr(−1,−1) = p2
pi−1,d = Pr(−1, d) = p(1− p) = Pr(d,−1) = pid,−1
pid,d = Pr(d, d) = (1− p)2
Denoting by si,j the empirical frequency of the realization (i, j) in this com-
posite sample allows us to redefine the pivotal event in terms of a subset of
empirical frequencies s = (s−1,−1, s−1,d, sd,−1, sd,d):
RN =
{
sN | (sd,−1 − s−1,d) /∈
(−√2c0 − β1
d+ 1
,
√
2c0 − β1
d+ 1
)}
For any empirical distribution s, let D(s||pi) the relative entropy of s with
respect to pi:
D(s||pi) =
∑
i,j∈{−1,d}
si,j ln
(
si,j
pii,j
)
(11)
Denote
θl =
−√2c0 − β1
d+ 1
θh =
√
2c0 − β1
d+ 1
We will now show that in the N → ∞ limit, the distribution over sN con-
ditional on sN ∈ RN assigns probability one to the unique s that minimizes
D(s||pi) subject to the constraint sd,−1 − s−1,d = θh. Recall that we are re-
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stricting attention to a range of parameters such that −1 < θl < θh < 1.
We can partition the pivotal event RN into two closed intervals: [−1, θl] and
[θh, 1]. Because β1 > 0, |θl| < |θh|.
The relative entropy function D(s||pi) is strictly convex in s and attains
a unique unconstrained minimum of zero at s = pi. Furthermore, because
pi−1,d = pid,−1, D(s||pi) treats s−1,d and s−d,1 symmetrically. Therefore, for
any θ ∈ [−1, 1], the minimum of D(s||pi) subject to s−1,d − s−d,1 = θ is
equal to the minimum of D(s||pi) subject to sd,−1 − s−1,d = θ, such that the
minimum of D(s||pi) subject to sd,−1 − s−1,d = θ is strictly increasing with
|θ|. Therefore, the minimum of D(s||pi) subject to sd,−1 − s−1,d ∈ [θh, 1] is
strictly below the minimum of D(s||pi) subject to sd,−1− s−1,d ∈ [−1, θl]. By
Sanov’s Theorem (see Theorem 11.4.1 in Cover and Thomas (2006, p. 362)),
the probability of the event [θh, 1] is arbitrarily higher than the probability
of the event [−1, θl] as N → ∞. Therefore, we can take the pivotal event
to be [θh, 1]. Furthermore, by the conditional limit theorem (Theorem 11.6.2
in Cover and Thomas (2006, p. 371)), in the N → ∞ limit, the probability
that sd,−1 − s−1,d = θh conditional on the event sd,−1 − s−1,d ∈ [θh, 1] is one.
It follows that the objective function is D(s||pi) and the constraints are
sd,−1 − s−1,d =
√
2c0 − β1
d+ 1
s−1,−1 + s−1,d + sd,−1 + sd,d = 1
Writing down the Lagrangian, the first-order conditions with respect to (si,j)
are (λ1 and λ2 are the multipliers of the first and second constraints):
1 + ln s−1,−1 − ln p2 − λ2 = 0
1 + ln sd,d − ln(1− p)2 − λ2 = 0
1 + ln sd,−1 − ln p(1− p)− λ1 − λ2 = 0
1 + ln s−1,d − ln p(1− p) + λ1 − λ2 = 0
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These equations imply
sd,−1s−1,d = sd,ds−1,−1
s−1,−1 = d
2sd,d
Now, since
d =
p
1− p
ε¯1 = (sd,−1 + sd,d)(d+ 1)− 1
ε¯0 = (s−1,d + sd,d)(d+ 1)− 1
we have that in the N →∞ limit, the distribution over ε conditional on the
pivotal event assigns probability one to
ε¯0 = −1
2
(
√
2c0 − β1)−
d
d− 1 +
1
2
√
(
√
2c0 − β1)2 +
4d2
(d− 1)2
ε¯1 =
1
2
(
√
2c0 − β1)−
d
d− 1 +
1
2
√
(
√
2c0 − β1)2 +
4d2
(d− 1)2
Plugging these values into (6)) produces the result.
Thus, the incentive-compatibility problem in the Bernoulli-noise exam-
ple does not vanish when the sample is large. Moreover, the more skewed
the underlying noise distribution and the larger the complexity cost, the
larger the set of prior beliefs for which incentive-compatibility is violated in
the N → ∞ limit. The reason that large samples do not fix the incentive-
compatibility problem is that the agent’s reasoning hinges on the pivotal
event in which the variable is included. Therefore, even if the estimator’s
unconditional distribution is asymptotically well-behaved, the relevant ques-
tion for incentive-compatibility is whether it is well-behaved conditional on
the pivotal event.
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Recall that our original assumption of only two observations captured (in
a highly stylized fashion) the idea that model selection can avert over-fitting.
When we continue to assume a single explanatory variable and raise N , the
over-fitting problem is attenuated and the role of model selection diminishes.
Indeed, practitioners of penalized regression adjust penalty parameters to
sample size, such that c0, c1 → 0 as N → ∞. The key question is therefore
whether the rate by which c0 or c1 decrease with N is fast enough to outweigh
the model selection curse. To answer this question, one needs to characterize
the condition for incentive-compatibility for arbitrary values ofN, c0, c1. This
is an open question that we leave for future work.
5 Conclusion
Interactions between humans and machines that follow statistical procedures
are becoming ubiquitous, giving rise to interesting questions for economists.
Our question is whether human decision makers should act cooperatively to-
ward a machine that employs a non-Bayesian statistical procedure that aims
at good predictions. We demonstrated, via a toy example, that the element
of model selection in the procedure creates non-trivial incentive issues.
Our little exercise exposed a major methodological challenge. The stan-
dard economic model of interactive decision making is based on the Bayesian,
common-prior paradigm. However, the actual behavior of machine decision
makers is often hard to reconcile with this paradigm. We addressed this chal-
lenge by examining the agent’s response to a fixed statistical procedure with
a given specification of its parameters. One would like to endogenize these
choices. However, given that the procedure is fundamentally non-Bayesian,
capturing this endogenization with a well-defined ex-ante optimization prob-
lem is not obvious. Incorporating incentive-compatibility as a criterion for
selecting prediction methods is therefore conceptually challenging.
In general, modeling strategic interactions that involve machine learning
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requires us to depart from the conventional Bayesian framework, toward an
approach that admits decision makers who act as non-Bayesian statisticians.
Such approaches are familiar to us from the bounded rationality literature
(e.g., Osborne and Rubinstein (1998), Spiegler (2006), Cherry and Salant
(2016) and Liang (2018)). Further study of human-machine interactions is
likely to generate new ideas for modeling interactions that involve boundedly
rational human decision makers.
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Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1
Fix the realization of sample noise ε. The coefficients b0 and b1 are given by
the solution to the first-order conditions of
min
b0,b1
∑
x=0,1
(yx − b0 − b1x)2 + c01b1 6=0 + c1|b1|
where the dependence of the coefficients b0 and b1 on the noise realization ε
is suppressed for notational ease.
The first-order condition with respect to b0 is
(y0 − b0) + (y1 − b0 − b1) = 0 (12)
while the first-order condition with respect to b1 when b1 6= 0 gives
2(y1 − b0 − b1) = sign(b1)c1 (13)
In particular, 2(y1 − b0 − b1) = c1 when b1 > 0, and 2(y1 − b0 − b1) = −c1
when b1 < 0.
From (12) we obtain
b0 =
1
2
(y0 + y1 − b1)
Plugging this into (13), we obtain the following characterization of b1 condi-
tional on it being non-zero:
b1 =
{
β1 + ε1 − ε0 − c1 if b1 > 0
β1 + ε1 − ε0 + c1 if b1 < 0
This means in particular that when β1 + ε1 − ε0 ∈ (−c1, c1), b1 = 0.
To complete the characterization of when b1 6= 0, we compute the differ-
ence between the Residual Sum of Squares (RSS) when the coefficient b1 is
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admitted and when it is omitted. First,
RSS(b1 6= 0) = (b0 − y0)2 + (b0 + b1 − y1)2
where b0 and b1 are given by (12) and (13). In contrast, when b1 is omitted,
b0 =
1
2
(y0 + y1), such that
RSS(b1 = 0) =
(
1
2
y0 +
1
2
y1 − y0
)2
+
(
1
2
y0 +
1
2
y1 − y1
)2
=
1
2
(y1 − y0)2
It follows that
RSS(b1 = 0)− RSS(b1 6= 0) = 1
2
(y1 − y0)2 − (b0 − y0)2 − (b0 + b1 − y1)2
= b1[y1 − y0 − 1
2
b1]
= [y1 − y0 − sign(b1)c1][y1 − y0 − 1
2
(y1 − y0 − sign(b1)c1)]
=
1
2
(y1 − y0)2 − 1
2
(c1)
2
=
1
2
(β1 + ε1 − ε0)2 −
1
2
(c1)
2
The condition for b1 6= 0 is
RSS(b1 = 0)−RSS(b1 6= 0) ≥ c0
i.e.
(β1 + ε1 − ε0)2 ≥ (c1)2 + 2c0
This concludes the proof.
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